ABSTRACT Exploiting a 2004 reduction in a unique capital gains withholding tax for foreign investors in U.S. REITs, this paper explores both the sensitivity of real estate investors to changes in their own taxes and the reaction of real estate managers to changes in their investors' taxes. We find that both foreign investors and REIT managers responded to the tax change. This is consistent with taxes both restricting the flow of foreign capital into U.S. REITs and affecting the management of their real estate properties. To our knowledge, this is the first paper documenting that U.S. managers change their U.S. operations in response to the tax positions of foreign investors. This work should spur further study of the interplay between real estate and income taxes, the role of taxes on foreign portfolio investment, and the role of taxes on real managerial decisions. It also should aid policymakers who are considering further relaxing the discriminatory tax treatment for foreign investors in U.S. real estate.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the impact of a unique tax on foreign investors in U.S. real estate investment trusts (REITs). Similar to mutual funds, REIT profits are exempt from entity-level U.S. taxes. Instead, each form of profit retains its character (e.g., capital gain, rent, etc.) and is taxed on the investor's tax return. Consequently, the portion of U.S. REIT taxable income attributable to foreign investors normally would escape U.S. taxation because foreigners are not required to file U.S. tax returns. However, since 1980, special withholding taxes arising from the We analyze one type of REIT profit, gains from the sale of real estate property, which is subject to unusually harsh FIRPTA taxes. From 1980 to 2004, the U.S. levied a 35% withholding tax on all capital gains distributions to foreign investors. Since then, if certain conditions are met, the U.S. taxes the foreigners' portion of the capital gains at that country's dividend withholding tax rate, which varies by country, ranging up to 30%. For example, in 2005 the REIT capital gains withholding tax rate for Canadian investors dropped to 30%, for British investors to 15%, and for Japanese investors to 10%.
We exploit this 2005 change in the U.S. withholding tax on REIT capital gains to test for the responsiveness of both foreign investors and REIT managers to changes in corporate tax rates. We predict that the largest increases in foreign investment in U.S. REITs in 2005 were from countries where the withholding tax rate fell the most (e.g., greater increases in investment from Japan, where rates fell to 10%, than from Canada, where rates only declined to 30%).
Similarly, we are curious as to whether the tax change affected capital gains realizations.
If REIT managers were sensitive to this change, then REITs with disproportionate investments from countries that enjoyed the large withholding tax rate reductions should have realized larger increases in capital gains after 2005 than did REITs whose investors were less affected by the tax cuts. In other words, we expect REIT managers considered the reduction in their foreign investors' U.S. withholding taxes when they rebalanced their portfolios.
To our knowledge, no one has addressed the responsiveness of foreign investors or managers to REIT tax changes. In fact, few studies have studied the reaction of foreign investors to any domestic tax changes. An exception is Amiram and Frank (2012) who report that relatively favorable tax policies on dividend income earned by foreign investors are associated with larger amounts of foreign portfolio investment. Similarly, we are unaware of any research documenting that domestic managers alter their operations in response to the changing tax incentives of foreign investors. Blouin et al. (2011) have related work on the domestic front.
They report that managers adjusted their mix of dividends and share repurchases after dividend and capital gains tax rates were changed in 2003 for U.S. individual investors, although changes were concentrated in those companies where insiders held disproportionate interests. However, they are examining domestic investors and we are investigating foreign ones. Also, they are exploring payout policies, as opposed to "real" decisions, such as the sale of apartments, office buildings and other properties. Thus, to our knowledge, this is the first study of whether there is a connection between real choices that managers make and foreign tax clienteles.
In our empirical tests, we estimate the amount of investment in each publicly-traded U.S.
REIT from asset managers in 18 major foreign countries in both 2004 commercial real estate market could have been marginal. In other words, the findings in the paper are consistent with FIRPTA withholding taxes dampening foreign investment in U.S.
REITs; however, it is beyond the scope of this paper to quantify the change in total inbound foreign investment in U.S. real estate following the 2004 rate reduction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background.
Section 3 develops the testable hypothesis. Section 4 details the empirical design. Section 5 presents the findings. Section 6 describes robustness tests. Closing remarks follow.
REIT and FIRPTA Background
REITs are corporate entities (corporation, trust, or association) that invest in real estate. 1 The investments may be equity (ownership and operation) or debt (direct lending or investment in mortgage backed securities). As with mutual funds, investors buy shares in REITs, which can be publicly-traded or privately-traded. By pooling the investors' capital and investing in real estate assets, REITs enable individuals and entities to invest in liquid, diversified, professionally managed, income-producing real estate. REIT is traded on an established securities market in the U.S., and (2) the foreign shareholder 4 Specifically, a foreign investor is subject to U.S. income tax on income from disposition of U.S. real estate property interests (USRPI). USRPI includes both a direct investment in real estate and an indirect investment through the stock of a U.S. real property holding corporation (i.e., a USRPHC, a corporation whose assets are primarily made up of USRPIs). A foreign investor who sells stock of a U.S. REIT is considered selling stock of a USRPHC and is therefore subject to FIRPTA. In addition, FIRPTA applies if foreign investors receive a capital gains distribution from a U.S. REIT, as a result of its selling real property. REITs making distributions to a foreign investor must collect the withholding tax and remit it to the U.S. FIRPTA takes precedence over existing tax treaties that might provide otherwise. 5 35% capital gains tax + (30% branch profits tax * 65% after-tax proceeds) = 54.5%
owns 5% or less of the REIT (at any time during the previous one year). If it meets these conditions, the REIT capital gains distribution is taxed as though it was an ordinary dividend.
The general rule is that when foreigners receive ordinary dividends, 30% of issue is withheld and forwarded to the U.S. government as a tax. However, the U.S. has tax treaties with many countries that lower the ordinary dividend withholding tax rate. As a result, the median dividend withholding tax rate in our sample is only 15%. 6 In recent years, legislation has been repeatedly introduced to expand the FIRPTA exception by increasing the foreign shareholder percentage from 5% to 10% but has yet to pass both houses of Congress. 7 One of the possible contributions of this paper is to provide some insights into the responsiveness of investors and managers to the adoption of the 5% exemption and thus shed some light on the likely impact of expanding to 10%.
Hypothesis Development
As noted above, as long as a REIT distributes 90% of its profits to its investors, it can avoid entity-level income taxes on these distributed profits. One source of profits is gains on the sale of appreciated real estate. From 1980 to 2004, when REITs distributed these gains to foreign investors, they were required to withhold 35% of the profits and remit them to the federal government. Responding to assertions that the 35% withholding tax was depressing the value of U.S. commercial real estate by constraining the supply of foreign capital in U.S. REITs, Congress reset the capital gains withholding tax equal to the dividend withholding rate under certain conditions. Specifically, the post-2004 capital gains withholding rate equals the one levied on distributions arising from rents and other sources of ordinary income if the REIT is publicly-traded and the foreign investor owns no more than 5% of the REIT. The effect was to lower the withholding tax for qualifying foreign investors from 35% to no more than 30%, the maximum dividend withholding rate. This leads to the paper's first hypothesis, which concerns the investors' reaction to the withholding rate reduction: Besides the usual lack of power that thwarts empirical research, we may fail to find a positive correlation between tax rate reductions and foreign investment for at least four reasons. If attracting and retaining foreign investment is important to REIT managers, we anticipate that there was a negative correlation between the realized capital gains and the capital gains withholding rates of its foreign investors. 
Research Design

Regression Equation
To test the first hypothesis about the responsiveness of investors to tax changes, we start by expressing the investment from all investors in a foreign country into a single U.S. REIT (Y)
as a function of the REIT (REIT), the country (COUNTRY), and the capital gains withholding tax rate the U.S. applies to investors from that country (τ):
We then take the first differences. Employing a changes model is advantageous because it enables us to rule out a host of alternative explanations. Since the REIT and the country are the same in both years for any pair and the 2004 capital gains withholding tax rate is a constant 35% for all observations, multiple terms drop out of the equation. This leaves the following expression to estimate:
We will interpret a negative coefficient on as consistent with the capital gains withholding taxes under FIRPTA constraining foreign investment in the U.S. REITs.
The second hypothesis concerns the sensitivity of REIT managers to changes in the withholding taxes for foreign investors. We begin by stating the capital gains distributions for any U.S. REIT (CG) as a function of the characteristics of that REIT (REIT) and the aggregate tax incentives of its foreign investors. We estimate the latter using a measure we term the "weighted, mean tax rate" (wmτ):
The wmτ is intended to provide a single statistic that captures the aggregate tax position of the foreign investors in a particular REIT. (SEC), and include institutional investment managers with over $100 million of equity investments that bought REIT stock for either their own account or as an investment manager with discretion over which securities are bought and sold for the accounts of others. 9 They include investment funds, banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, pension funds, and corporations. 10 For each year, we determine the percentage of shares held by all non-pension, 9 Ideally, we would like to have the names and countries of all shareholders of record. Tracking individual investors is problematic since they tend to hold securities in "street name" meaning that the name of the beneficial owner of the stock does not appear on the REIT shareholder record file; instead, the stock is registered in the beneficial owner's broker's name. However, the SEC 13F filing requirements allow us to have access to specific information about the holdings of large institutional investment managers regardless of holdings in street name rather than beneficial ownership. This is in keeping with the data used by Chan, Leung, and Wang (1998) the typical REIT in our sample is large with sales of nearly $800 million and assets of $4 billion but has little foreign ownership (1.57%). The relatively few shares owned by investors from abroad is consistent with both home bias and FIRPTA's dampening foreign interest in U.S.
REITs. It also raises doubts about whether the tax considerations for such a small set of investors matters to REIT managers and, even if they do, whether the standard crude instruments available to an empiricist will be capable of detecting their importance. REITs have foreign investors from only one country. country invested 78% more in 2005 in a particular U.S. REIT than they did if the rate only fell to 30%, ceteris paribus. In short, the evidence suggests that when the FIRPTA taxes were cut, investment rose, and the increases varied across countries depending on the amount of the rate reductions. Not surprisingly, the other regression coefficient, the one on lagged investment, is positive and highly significant, consistent with investment being sticky.
Results
H1: Responsiveness of Foreign Investors
The parsimony of the research design might suggest that the model lacks adequate controls. However, it is difficult to conjecture alternative explanations for these findings. By using a "changes" model, we have allowed each country-REIT combination to control for itself. We now predict that . As before, a negative is consistent with investment coming from (withdrawing from) countries when withholding tax rates have fallen (risen). By comparing the two tax coefficients, we can assess whether foreign investment into U.S. REITs is sensitive to U.S. capital gains withholding taxes.
The second column in Table 2 , Panel B reveals a negative and significant and an insignificant When we compare the two coefficients, as predicted, we find and significant at the 0.01 level. This is consistent with capital gains withholding taxes adversely affecting foreign investment in U.S. REITs from 2005-2010, i.e., more than just the year of the initial legislative change. The first column of Table 3 , Panel B shows summary statistics from estimating equation (4). Neither tax variable is significantly different from zero. Thus, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis.
H2: Responsiveness of REIT Managers
One reason that regression equation (4) may be insufficiently powerful to reject the null is that the tax measures include both the effect of changes in the tax rates and the effect of changes in the mix of foreign ownership. For example, recall that wmτ is 0.5% if 2% of the REIT's investors are Japanese with a 10% withholding tax rate and 1% are Canadian with a 30% withholding tax rate. However, suppose that the rates are unchanged, but Canadian investors purchase all of the Japanese shares. Then, the wmτ would jump to 0.9%, implying that the U.S.
increased its withholding tax rates when actually the mix of foreign investors was the only change. Therefore, to tease out the effect related to rate changes, we need a refined tax measure that controls for ownership changes.
We start by recognizing that is the foreign ownership at the beginning of t times the applicable withholding tax rates for t. Taking differences between two years:
The first term becomes the primary variable of interest. It captures the change in tax rates, holding constant foreign ownership. The second term, , captures the impact of changes arising from a new mix of foreign investors, holding constant the tax rate. We now substitute these two terms for and and reestimate equation (4). 13 We predict a negative sign on the first term, the change in tax rates, consistent with REIT managers realizing more capital gains as tax rates fall for their foreign investors. We have no prediction for the second term, the change in ownership. It serves solely as a control.
The second column of Table 3 , Panel B shows that the coefficient on the change in rates is negative, as predicted, but the coefficient is insignificant. This failure to reject the null could arise for at least two reasons. First, the sample size is small. Second, the sale of large commercial properties typically involves a significant lag time.
13 Unlike the weighted mean tax variables, we cannot take natural logarithms of these new two terms because they are sometimes negative.
To address these two concerns, we expand the analysis to include all observations through 2009, adjusting the other regression variables and adding annual categorical variables:
14 Table 3 , Panel B shows that, when we estimate equation (5), remains negative and is now significant. This finding is consistent with REIT managers altering their portfolio rebalancing to minimize their foreign investors' U.S. withholding taxes. The coefficient on ownchange is also significant. Together, these results suggest that the separation of rate and ownership effects is necessary to understand the tax impact on portfolio management decisions.
Robustness Tests
We close with two sensitivity tests. First, our results in Table 3 , Panel B indicates that there is an inverse correlation between U.S. REITs' realized capital gains and the U.S.
withholding taxes for their foreign investors. However, it is possible that this correlation can be explained by other factors. Foreign investors tend to be drawn to larger, more liquid REITs.
Therefore we tested whether the correlation could be explained by the fact that larger REITs made larger capital gains distributions. We re-estimate equation (5), including a control for REIT size:
Table 4, Panel A shows that including a control for size (REIT sales in Column 1 and REIT total assets in Column 2) has little impact on the coefficient of interest, β2.
Second, as discussed previously, the law change only affected the withholding taxes on capital gains distributions. Thus, we would not expect similar patterns in and after 2005 for 14 We do not extend our sample to 2010 here because there were no withholding rate changes in our sample from 2009 to 2010.
other forms of REIT distributions. To ensure that this is the case, we undertake falsification tests, estimating equation (6) with ordinary distributions and return of capital distributions in lieu of capital gains distributions. If we find significant results, using distributions for which taxes were not altered, the inferences from above would be drawn into question.
As expected, we find no significant results. The results in Table 4 , Panel B illustrate that the coefficients on ratechange and ownchange remain insignificant across all specifications.
Together, the results of Table 3 , Panel B and Table 4 , Panel B are consistent with REIT managers responding to foreign investor withholding tax changes by managing REIT capital gains distributions alone.
Closing Remarks
Although tax policy plays an important role in the real estate industry, remarkably little empirical research has been conducted about the impact of taxes on real estate at the investor and manager level. This paper exploits a change in the taxation of REIT capital gains for foreign investors to explore both the responsiveness of real estate investors to changes in their own taxes and the responsiveness of real estate managers to changes in their investors' taxes. We find evidence consistent with foreign investors responding to the 2004 reduction in capital gains withholding taxes, as well as evidence that rate reductions impacted REIT managers' real asset disposition strategies. We interpret these results as evidence that FIRPTA restricts the flow of foreign capital into U.S. REITs and affects the management of REITs.
Our findings add a contrary observation to prior research that found that individual taxes of investors-unless they are very large shareholders or insiders-rarely affect the payout decisions of managers of publicly traded companies and mutual funds. (Brown et al. 2007) In contrast, we find that the rate reductions of a small group of individual investors did have an impact on the portfolio decisions of publicly traded REIT. These results surprise us and are worthy of further work to determine the unique factors in the REIT setting and/or the other considerations that explain this divergence from prior work.
More generally, this paper should encourage further study about the role of taxes in real estate investment and management. Few industries are so large, so influenced by tax policy, and so understudied by tax researchers. Second, more generally, the findings in this paper should expand our understanding of the role of taxes in foreign portfolio investment, which is increasingly important in a global capital market. Finally, the inferences from this paper should 2,000,000,000 3,000,000,000 4,000,000,000 5,000,000,000 6,000,000,000 Table 1 , summed for each REIT-country pair. lnY is the natural log of Y. τ is the relevant withholding tax rate for each country. ln τ is the natural log of τ. The 2005-2010 regression also includes year indicator variables, but coefficients are not shown. Pvalues in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample N=351. In each regression the dependent variable is the natural log of current year ordinary distributions (columns 1 and 2) or return of capital distributions (columns 3 and 4). lndistributions t-1 is the natural log of prior year ordinary distributions or return of capital distributions. All other variables defined in previous tables. Regressions also include year indicator variables, but coefficients are not shown. P-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
